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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Sec § 78-2a-(3) (2) (i) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the Appellee's Statement of Issues and Standard of 
Review is agreed upon as is set forth in Appellant's Brief, page 
2, and therefore, shall not be set forth separately in this 
Brief. 
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
A. Section 30-3-5(1), Utah Code Ann.,: *When a decree of 
divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations and 
parties." 
B. Section 30-3-5(7), Utah Code Ann.: (a) The Court shall 
consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient 
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spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
C. Section 30-3-5(7), Utah Code Ann.: (d) The Court may, 
under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were married on September 4, 1964. Although they 
had five children, all children were emancipated prior to the 
parties separation. At the time of trial, Petitioner PJeanny") 
was employed by the Bureau of Land Management. Petitioner 
submitted to the Court a 1999 tax return (Exh. 6) and a recent 
pay check stub to verify her income (Exh. 5) . Petitioner also 
testified to the accuracy of her income (Tr. 28) . Petitioner 
earned approximately $2,274.00 per month. 
Respondent (* Johnny") was employed as a cabinet maker. 
Respondent testified that she earned approximately $4,507.00 per 
month (Tr. 73) . The Respondent did not submit to the Court any 
tax return. He did not submit any pay check stub, nor any other 
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proof of his income, except for his testimony-
That difference between the parties income is $2,233.00 per 
month. 
The parties divorce was bifurcated on December 17, 1999 and 
trial was held on July 6, 2000. At trial, the parties stipulated 
to a partial division of real and personal property and five 
issues were heard by the trial court; 
a. Petitioner's request for an eight acre parcel of the 
farm property awarded to Petitioner; 
b. the division of remaining retirement assets because 
the Respondent has liquidated his retirement assets, while the 
case was pending; 
c. disposition of a bank account with approximately 
$10,000.00 remaining; 
d. Petitioner's alimony request, and; 
e. attorney's fees 
The Court made an equitable division of the real and 
personal property, and did not favor either party• The Court 
gave the Respondent a credit in the amount of $33,400.00 against 
his alimony obligation in order to equalize the real and personal 
property division, thus equalizing the division of the real and 
personal property. 
The Court ordered the Respondent to pay $1,000.00 to 
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Petitioner as for alimony for a period of ten years, even though 
the parties were married for over 35 years. 
The Court awarded each party their own retirement accounts. 
The Petitioner was awarded a Thrift Savings Account with 
$51,383.00 as the approximate balance and an anticipated pension 
of $150.00 per month. 
The Respondent liquidated most of his retirement funds, for 
ten years work, and spent the funds following the parties' 
separation and prior to the bifurcated divorce (Tr. 95). 
Respondent provided no accounting or exhibits to justify his 
expenditures. 
The Court awarded the Petitioner $2,500.00 in attorney's 
fees. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Argument 1: 
The Court did not abuse it's discretion in awarding 
Petitioner $1,000.00 per month, as for alimony, for a period of 
ten years. 
SUMMARY PARAGRAPH: 
Respondent concedes both that he has the ability to pay 
alimony and that the Petitioner does not earn enough from her 
employment to meet her monthly expenses. Respondent does not 
agree with the amount of alimony ordered. However, the trial 
court examined all relevant factors and concluded that the 
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Petitioner was in need of alimony in the amount of $1,000.00 per 
month, in order to maintain the standard of living enjoyed 
during the parities marriage. 
Argument 2. 
The Court did not abuse it's discretion in,dividing the 
retirement assets. 
SUMMARY PARAGRAPH: 
The trial court properly awarded the Petitioner a greater 
percentage share of the retirement account than the Respondent 
because it considered the special circumstances existing in the 
parties marriage. 
Argument 3. 
3. The Court did not abuse it's discretion bv ordering the 
Respondent to pay Petitioner's attorney's fees. In addition, the 
Petitioner should be awarded her attorney's fees on appeal. 
SUMMARY PARAGRAPH: 
The trial court considered the reasonableness of the Petitioner's 
fees, her need for an award of fees, including her ability to 
earn an income, as well as the Respondent's ability to earn an 
income and properly awarded the Petitioner $2,500.00 in 
attorney's fees. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. The Court did not abuse itfs discretion in awarding 
Petitioner $1,000.00 per month, as for alimony, for a period of 
ten vears> 
Respondent concedes his ability to pay alimony. 
(Respondent's Brief at page 6). 
Utah courts have held that "an alimony award should, after a 
marriage . . . and to the extent possible, equalize the parties1 
respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as 
close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage." Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P,2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); 
see also Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); Roberts 
v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah App. 1992); Bell v. Bell, 
810 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1991). 
The trial court attempted to equalize the parties respective 
standard of living by awarding Jeanny alimony. During the 
marriage both parties worked. The Court examined the issue of the 
standard of living during marriage and each parties7 ability to 
earn enough to maintain the standard of living that the parties 
both enjoyed during marriage. The Court found that the 
Respondent's ability to earn money was much greater than the 
Petitioner's (Tr 125). The Court made this finding based upon 
the Respondent's testimony alone, because the Respondent 
presented no pay check stubs to prove how much greater his income 
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a c t u a 1J y w a s 11 : a i : , 1:1 : ,. e I e 1: :i 1: i c • i i € :i : s a i i ci 1 i e p i e s e • i 11: e ci i i c I: a: ;: 
returns to prove his actual income. The Respondent admits on] y 
t h a t h e :i s cap ab J e o f p a y i n g a J :i mo n y an :i 1:1 i a t a b :i ] :i 1:;; /* :i s lie: t: :i i i 
d i s p u t e . (See R e s p o n d e n t ' s B r i e f at. page 6 ) . 
p r o o f as *:•*_ JVV much G r e a t e r h i s a b i l i t v wa^ t< e a r n money ha* 
t h e i"« " + ' ' r - ' iiaeiiL t 
test^riu^jv axon* . u,. l e a c r u t: ie COUJ I . : ^ j f u s p e c i f i c 
f i n d i n g s abou t t h e R e s p o n d e n t ' s a b i l i t y t o e a r n a l i v i n g (Tr . 
125) . 
Based upon the testimony of Respondent and the testimony and 
exi,.; ' ' ' i * M itl ME • p a r 1: i es i ncc ] 
JS approximate.:'; $2,^7-. y , ..: *; 'Kesf ondent/ s Brief at pa< 
J) . 
The trial court addressed and considered ^hc lenath of the 
marriage and found i t to be a 35 year marr' an^ -r 5 ' ' f, . 
. .- cri a- . . . . . r s t . •- . :.•. . *. . . . . ^  .., 
this case by T r - Respondent an«: found + -.a* ; ru. i'r.::.;cner f 
t e * : - - t: :i : :i a ] :: c i 1 1 1: :i s b e s 1: ab ] e 
tc determine v.: credibility • * witness. D fAshton v. Df 
Ashton, 844 P.2d 345, 355 (Ut. C t . A p p 1992). 
Respondent admits that the Petitioner does n^ +- °Rrn enough 
to meet her needs (Respondent's brief •-• raae? 5 and 6 ) . The 
issue presented on appeal then, questions whether or not the 
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amount ordered was an abuse of discretion. Considering that the 
trial court found the Petitioner's testimony and presentation to 
be more credible evidence than Respondent's, the trial court's 
alimony award to Petitioner in the amount of $1,000.00 per month 
does not appear to constitute an abuse of discretion. While the 
Respondent presented arguments which dispute the Petitioner's 
financial declaration, the trial court ruled that it found 
Petitioner's testimony more credible. The Petitioner testified 
(Tr. 70) that she needed at least $2,100.00 per month and that 
she netted only $1,369.51 per month, leaving her with a shortfall 
of $730.00. Respondent claims that the Petitioner's monthly needs 
should not include the monthly farm payment she made. Even 
allowing for the Respondent's argument, the trial court heard all 
the evidence and still found that the Petitioner was entitled to 
$1,000.00 per month as for alimony for a period of 10 years. 
Given the 35 year length of the marriage this was not an 
abuse of discretion. The total award of alimony was considered 
by the court when the trial court found that the Respondent 
should have the option of paying a one-time lump sum payment as 
for alimony. (See Findings of Fact, page 4, paragraph 9. Fund in 
Respondent's Addendum) 
In Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306, (Ut. Ct. App. 1999), the Utah 
Court of Appeals held: 
In determining whether to award alimony and in setting the 
amount, a trial court must consider the needs of the recipient 
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spouse, the earning capacity of the recipient spouse; the abi 1 :i ty 
of the obligor spouse to provide support; and the length of 
marriage. 
The Court did ex ami n«. Lin «ib' IVI- I J i I ul ! cjct 01 *s ; rmci 1 l'u 
results are a^ fellows; 
a. t * ie to 
at this time (Tr. 126); 
kespc iiidf-.h I * nl'i I .i I ', In c-arn was much greater 
than the Petitioner's (T t . 1 26) ; 
c i'j.4r rid prooi offered k>l Respondent that the 
Petitioner' s financial decl aration was inaccurate, Tiieie *. - y 
an argument that Respondent disagreed with her stated needs. 
Respondent concedes that tl le lt\ il ii-ii(*i fit » . n< I < un. » noii'il. I 
support, herseli. (See Respondent's Brief al page 6 ) . The li.aJ 
co Lii: t: f c m n id tl le I e t: :i t::i • :: i le i : s te s. !: i mon^ t : 1: e more credible vij-. 
126, . ; 
c- T • dent dd-rr * - + v a^+- his ability to pay alimony is 
conceded; <-« Respondent .. . .+ :. page 6) . 
f * rir1 ^r; -ddiessed the length of the marriage 
(T*r . . . 11 IIM-' I act ur .!:. net pssriry to 
s uppo r f a i. a .• : ,-,, \ irio n y 
w e wii]_ n o t disturb 
the tria. ecu: '/t ^Jinurv a*-*.. .n*es> M-^h a rericus inequity 
] •• •. < uiedi abuse ul •.: i s-rer • •.: * ." 
Childs v. Childs, 967 I1,2d 942, 946 (Utah Ct. App. Jy9tn. 
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The Respondent admits his ability to pay alimony, and admits 
the Petitioner's need. Respondent has failed to assert that any 
serious inequity has resulted, due to the award to the Petitioner 
of $1,000.00 per month in alimony for ten years, that would 
manifest a "'clear abuse of discretion/' Id. 
2. The Court did not abuse it's discretion in dividing the 
retirement assets. 
The Respondent disposed of most of his retirement accounts 
prior to trial (Tr. 86). Respondent was given credit for the 
accounts which he cashed out, which included his 401-K account 
with the state of Utah, in the amount of $6,730.95 and for his 
account at Horace Mann annuity in the amount of $5,765.80. These 
two amounts total $12,496.75. Respondent was also awarded the 
amount of $6,100.00 as for an * additional credit" against the 
American Express IDS account, for a total retirement credits of 
$18,596.75. 
The Respondent was also awarded his entire interest in the 
*Utah Retirement Systems Pension". (See Findings of Fact, at 
paragraphs 8 and 9 which is located in Respondent's Addendum to 
Brief). The exact amount of the award to Respondent is unclear 
because he presented no evidence or exhibits to document the 
value of his Utah Retirement Systems Pension which he was 
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a w a r d e d . 
Thh ] *H i t i ;.riei wn,,: awarded h e r t h r i f t a c c o u n t v a l u e d at 
$ 5 1 , 3 8 5 . 9 5 . The P e t i t i o n e r was awarded more t h a n i in h e s p t n n u i t 
because the t i i . i l f n u i t l o u n a UiuL a ^he s p f ^ i a i i ^ r c u m s t a n c e 
e x i s t e d i n t h a t t h e Responden t was muci, :i.v_. < ^ - . i | ! wiiri j rig 
riinl f- 1 , y muiit **.•: ' r l i L i o n e i , and arid-t i c n a l . / , t h a t t h e 
p a r t i e s 3h years" ._ ; luLii^age was ,c . .• - * 1 it ic-nn wa; 
t o a p o i n t n • r *: f ^ where sht u e e d e c i r> men* v much more t h a n 
t h e Responded . . - - • ;"".r ; 1 0. F i n d i n g s 
a r e i n c l u d e d a,c Respondent ' s H i ^ : , Addendum) 
* ' * ; r,c *r •, : J o ^ - . t i n o r e t i r e m e n t 
b e n e f i t s : : n : : vaiu* oepeno^ * : t n e p a : ; . i ^ u i . : 1 .-iijcet , " 
He t€ s . . . . * e. , 786 P . 2 a 231., • / . - * - ' - • . 989) . 
The t r i e , c o u r t was c l e a r • • i • 
s p e c i a <n r n p * ar.r*-< ^ x i s t t o . ! " c n s i o e r ^ d ?L yeai^- t i m a r r i a a e 
and .^L u ^ - a e / e . ^ . • a r n a n r r - c *• -A- 1 
a s >he j e n a t h r.iimcny V' y e a i s < , t h a t Lh*- P e t : t i c n e : . ::t • i c r 
1 • • t • . < . * han t • :(= r- ^ spondent ' s . 
V: x i t : t ~ : ! .i- ' i>/, i n Woodwarc \ . Woodward, ' ' * I , I ' ^ - l , 
-
 ;
 '-* , Liifc Utah ' ' i x r eme > •.n examined ^: equa l s p l i t ( 1 
r n e d i s t i u j u t a b l e p o r u . . , . < • i-ii i v i c ion is 
n o t n i a n a a i o r Maxwell v . M a x w e l l , 7 ^ d i^J, bi>-h nitafi r t . 
App. ] o o r n c . -i.*- . a a i l e v . : u - ,* 'M m o IT an V.L. 
App. 1987 and Marchant v . Marchant, 734 P. 2d 199 (Utah C t . App . 
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1987) . 
Therefore, the unequal split of retirement benefits by the 
trial court was not an abuse of discretion, given the special 
circumstances cited by the trial court. 
3. The Court did not abuse itfs discretion by ordering the 
Respondent to pay Petitioner's attorney's fees. In addition, the 
Petitioner should be awarded her attorneyys fees on appeal. 
The Court awarded the Petitioner attorney's fees in the 
amount of $2,500.00. The Court found that the fees were 
reasonable (Tr. 126). 
The Court found that the Respondent had the ability to earn 
more than Petitioner and that the Petitioner was in need of an 
award of attorney's fees, based upon the trial court's 
examination of both parties' respective incomes. (Tr. At 126). 
The award was pursuant to the three requirements set forth in 
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991), which set 
forth the need for * evidence of the receiving spousefs financial 
need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness 
of the requested fees/' Bell at 493. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1995), a trial court 
may award attorney fees in divorce and custody proceedings. 
The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests 
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primarily in. the sound discretion oi the tiiaJ court. See Kei i v. 
Kerr, 610 P.2d 1280, 1384 (Utah 1980). 
Because the Petit5 oner was awarded attorney "' s fees by the 
trial court., she should also be awarded attorneys' lees fc: he: 
appeal, should she prevail. HaJ J \ , ::c . . • \- , 3d J 
1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
CONCI .1 JSIOl J 
*
 f
 . *; ' • • • requests U a i txj-al coi 3 r tf s 
decision oe a* i * i ii't-<;> .. • *. ci-imony, retirement benefits 
distribution ^na a L P r ^ v ' F fees. Petitioner requests that she be 
awarded, her attorney's lees jULiined i i,i dj pedJ . 
DATED this C>/ da 
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AM.'ENDUM 
1. Utah Code Ann., Sec § 78-2a-(3) (2)(i) 
2. Utah Code Ann., Sec § 30-3-5(1) 
3. Utah Code Ann., Sec § 30-3-5(7) (a) 
f. Utah Code Ann., Sec § 30-3-5(7) (d) 
78-2-7 JUDICIAL CODE 522 
support staff shall be established by the appellate court 
administiator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme 
C o u r t 198G 
78-2-7. Repea led . i98(> 
78-2-7.5. Service of sher i f f to court. 
The court may at any time lequire the attendance and 
services of any sheriff in the state 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14 R e p e a l e d 1986,1988 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-l Creation — Seal 
78-2a-2 Numbei of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees 
78-2a-3 Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
78-2a-4 Review of actions by Supreme Court 
78-2a-5 Location of Court of Appeals 
78-2a-6 Appellate Mediation Office — Protected records 
and information — Governmental immunity 
78-2a-l . Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal 
1986 
78-2a-2. Number of j u d g e s — Terms — Funct ions — 
Fi l ing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum oi 
fraction thereof for the period served 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected A presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals may serve in tha t office no more than two 
successive terms The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve m the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels, 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court, 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals, and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court 1988 
78-2a-3 Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(3) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex 
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary 
(a) to cany into effect its judgments, orders, and de 
crecs, or 
(b) in aid of its junsdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ 
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) the final oiders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative pioceedmgs of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed 
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis 
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Ttust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc 
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
(b) appeals from the district court review of 
d) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies, and 
(n) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12 1, 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts, 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record m 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony, ' 
(e) appeals from a court of record m criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony, 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony, 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi 
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except m cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony, 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela 
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul 
ment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity, 
d) appeals from the Utah Military Court, and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the require-
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, m its review of agency adjudicative proceedings 1996 
78-2a-4. Review of act ions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of 
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court 1986 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location m Salt Lake 
City The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in 
any location within the state 1986 
78-2a-6. Appellate Mediation Office — Protected 
records and information — Governmental im-
munity. 
(1) Unless a more restrictive rule of court is adopted pur-
suant to Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b), information and records 
relating to any matter on appeal received or generated by the 
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(d) willful neglect of the respondent to provide for the 
petitioner the common necessaries of life; 
(e) habitual drunkenness of the respondent; 
(f) conviction of the respondent for a felony; 
(g) cruel treatment of the petitioner by the respondent 
to the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental 
distress to the petitioner; 
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage; 
(i) incurable insanity; or 
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately 
under a decree of separate maintenance of any state for 
three consecutive years without cohabitation. 
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection (3)(j) does 
not affect the liability of either party under any provision for 
separate maintenance previously granted. 
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the grounds of 
insanity unless: 
(i) the respondent has been adjudged insane by the 
appropriate authorities of this or another state prior 
to the commencement of the action; and 
(ii) the court finds by the testimony of competent 
witnesses that the insanity of the respondent is 
incurable. 
(b) The court shall appoint for the respondent a guard-
ian ad litem who shall protect the interests of the respon-
dent. A copy of the summons and complaint shall be 
served on the respondent in person- or by publication, as 
provided by the laws of this state in other actions for 
divorce, or upon his guardian ad litem, and upon the 
county attorney for the county where the action is pros-
ecuted. 
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the merits of 
the case and if the respondent resides out of this state, 
take depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and 
make a defense as is just to protect the rights of the 
respondent and the interests of the state. 
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction 
over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property, 
and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as 
the courts and judges possess in other actions for divorce. 
(e) The petitioner or respondent may, if the respondent 
resides in this state, upon notice, have the respondent 
brought into the court at trial, or have an examination of 
the respondent by two or more competent physicians, to 
determine the mental condition of the respondent. For 
this purpose either party may have leave from the court to 
enter any asylum or institution where the respondent 
may be confined. The costs of court in this action shall be 
apportioned by the court. 1997 
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce. 
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife 
for the same causes and in the same manner as the wife may 
obtain a divorce from her husband. 1953 
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — 
Temporary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3,4, or 6, and 
in any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child 
support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, 
the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and 
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party 
to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The 
order may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, 
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic 
case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the 
claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no 
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party 
is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may 
order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the 
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other 
party and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the 
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of 
the action or in the final order or judgment. 1993 
30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Use of affi-
davit — Sealing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the 
petitioner or petitioner's attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default 
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the 
cause. If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the 
respondent, evidence to support the decree may be sub-
mitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the ap-
proval of the court. 
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or 
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both 
parties have attended the mandatory course described in 
Section 30-3-11.3, and have presented a certificate of 
course completion to the court The court may waive this 
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of 
the parties, if it determines course attendance and 
completion are not necessary/appropriate, feasible, or in 
the best interest of the parties. 
(d) All hearings and trials- for divorce shall be held 
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by 
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council. The 
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter 
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree 
after default of the .respondent, upon the petitioner's 
affidavit. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by 
order of the court upon the motion of either party. The sealed 
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order 
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or 
attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office 
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied 
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full 
access to the entire record. This sealing does not apply to 
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree. 1997 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 1990 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Divi-
sion of debts — Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — De-
termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious pe-
tition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of 
the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance 
for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible 
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties of the parties contracted or incurred during 
marriage; 
ai3 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respec-
tive creditors or obligees, regarding the court's divi-
sion of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding 
the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance 
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child 
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an order 
.allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the 
-dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subse-
quent changes or new orders for the custody of the children 
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and 
-for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grand-
parents, and other members of the immediate family, the 
court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for 
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an 
order establishing a visitation schedule a provision, 
among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under 
this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visita-
tion provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court 
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
•expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court 
determines that the petition was without merit and not 
"asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a 
visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member 
of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where 
a visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the 
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including 
"actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing 
party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise 
court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following fac-
tors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipi-
ent spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of 
minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a busi-
ness owned or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contrib-
uted to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by 
paying for education received by the payor spouse or 
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the 
marriage, 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in 
determining alimony. 
-(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the 
standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in 
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection 
(7)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, m its discretion, base 
alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time 
of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children 
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider the standard of living that existed at 
the time of the marriage 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, 
attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of 
living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the 
threshold of a major change in the income of one of the 
spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change 
shall be considered in dividmg the marital property and 
in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earnmg capacity has been greatly enhanced through the 
efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may 
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short 
duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived 
or born during the marriage, the court may consider 
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
substantive changes and new orders regarding ali-
mony based on a substantial material change in 
circumstances .not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court'-may not mb'dify alimony or issue a 
new order for alimony to address needs of the recipi-
ent that did not exist at the time the decree was 
entered, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any 
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be consid-
ered, except as provided in this Subsection (7). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent 
spouse's financial ability to share living ex-
penses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a 
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the 
payor's improper conduct justifies that consider-
ation. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer 
than the number of years that the marriage existed 
unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the 
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides other-
wise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage 
or death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony 
shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to 
the action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party 
paying alimony tha t the former spouse is cohabitating with 
another person. 1999 
30-3-5.1. Provision for income withholding in child 
support order. 
Whenever a court enters an order for child support, i t shall 
include in the order a provision for withholding income as a 
means of collecting child support as provided in Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 1997 
30-3-5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sexual 
abuse — Investigation. 
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request for 
modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of child abuse or 
